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COMMENTS
Gagging the Press Through Participant and
Closure Orders: The Aftermath of Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart
Three years ago, in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,'
the Supreme Court struck down a state court injunction prohibit-
ing pretrial publication of matters deemed prejudicial to an ac-
cused murderer. The Court held that trial courts trying to mini-
mize prejudicial publicity to preserve a fair trial must consider
alternatives less drastic than gagging the press. Yet despite a
unanimous pro-media' decision on the issue of direct gag orders,
Nebraska Press has not fostered dissemination of information on
judicial proceedings. Because Nebraska Press focused almost ex-
1. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The decision has generated a great deal of commentary. See
generally Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539 (1977); Bezanson,
The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. Rav. 731 (1977); Fenner & Koley, The Rights
of the Press and the Closed Criminal Proceeding, 57 NEB. L. Rzv. 442 (1978); Freedman
& Starwood, Prior Restraint on Freedom of Expression by Defendants and Defense A ttor-
neys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 607 (1977); Garry & Riordan,
Gag Orders, Cui Bono?, 29 STAN. L. R.Ev. 575 (1977); Goodale, The Press Ungagged: The
Practical Effect on Gag Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L.
Rzv. 497 (1977); Isaacson, Fair Trial and Free Press: An Opportunity for Co-existence, 29
STAN. L. Rav. 561 (1977); Larson & Murphy, Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart-A Prosecu-
tor's View of Pretrial Restraints on the Press, 26 DEPAuL L. Rav. 417 (1977); Portman,
The Defense of Fair Trial from Sheppard to Nebraska Press Ass'n: Benign Neglect to
Affirmative Action and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 393 (1977); Sack, Principle and
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 411 (1977); Schmidt, Nebraska Press
Ass'n: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431 (1977);
Schmidt & Volner, Nebraska Press Ass'n: An Open or Shut Decision?, 29 STAN. L. REv.
529 (1977); Shellow, The Voice of the Grass: Erwin Charles Simants' Efforts to Secure a
Fair Trial, 29 STAN. L. REv. 477 (1977); Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska
Press Ass'n Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29
STAN. L. REv. 515 (1977); Younger, Some Thoughts on the Defense of Publicity Cases, 29
STAN. L. Rv. 591 (1977).
2. This comment's scope is limited to the print media and does not extend to the
broadcasting media. Pointing to differences in the characteristics of the two, primarily the
limited number of television and radio frequencies to allocate, the Supreme Court has
applied different first amendment standards to them. See generally Barrow, The Fairness
Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and Print Media, 26 HASTNos L.J. 659 (1975).
Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (statute granting
political candidates a right to equal space to reply to criticism by a newspaper held void
on its face because it purported to regulate the content of a newspaper in violation of the
first amendment) with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (FCC's
regulations requiring a broadcast station to offer a figure involved in a public issue an
opportunity to respond and to offer reply time to opponents after allowing endorsement
of one political opponent held constitutional).
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clusively on the prior restraint doctrine, emphasizing a gag
order's form rather than its effect on media coverage of the judi-
cial system, the decision did not elaborate a principle applicable
to orders that, although technically not prior restraints, neverthe-
less effectively restrain media coverage of judicial events. Accord-
ingly, appellate courts generally have held Nebraska Press in-
applicable when reviewing lower courts' resort to closed judicial
proceedings, sealed records, and gag orders on trial participants.'
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, appellate courts have
established various standards for determining the validity of
these restraints-restraints that often interfere substantially with
the press' role as a check on the abuses of governmental power.4
3. See United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1208 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 968 (1978); In re Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. Appl. 3d 777, 783, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824
(1977); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 502, 387 A.2d 425, 432
(1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-155 (U.S. July 27, 1978).
4. The press, no doubt, does not always fulfill this role responsibly. See, e.g., Hallam,
Some Object Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 MINN. L. Rv. 453, 454 (1940)
(Bruno Hauptman's trial for the murder of Charles Lindberg's baby termed "perhaps the
most spectacular and depressing example of improper publicity and professional miscon-
duct ever presented to the people of the United States in a criminal trial"). See also
Portman, supra note 1.
Many commentators, however, suggest the first amendment's press clause was de-
signed to insure the press' institutional independence, thus effecting a separation of the
press from government and requiring editorial autonomy regarding both the form and
substance of published material. Bezanson, supra note 1, at 732; Stewart, Or of the Press,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975). This theory is similar to the libertarian theory of speech
and press that emerged during the Sedition Act debates. See Seibert, The Libertarian
Theory of the Press, in F. SEIBERT, T. PETERSON & W. SCHRAMM, FOUR THEORIES OF THE
PRESS (1956). One commentator maintains the importance of securing the press' inde-
pendence stems from fears implicit in Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 631 (1919): "Persecution for the expression of opinion seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result
with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all your
opposition." Bezanson, supra note 1, at 732. Much of the case law outside of the broadcast
setting supports this theory. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974); Chicago Joint Bd., Amal. Cloth. Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F. 2d
470, 478 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151,
153 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968). See also note 2 supra.
The contrasting social responsibility theory of the press is based on the premise the
press has enforceable responsibilities, including the obligation to be accurate in reporting,
to report matters of which the public should be aware, and to present all sides of an issue.
See Peterson, The Social Responsibility Theory of the Press, in F. SEI E r, T. PETERSON
& W. SCHRAMM, supra. The theory's rationale-that the press should be held accountable
for its actions-is well-expressed in a concurring opinion Justice Frankfurter wrote when
the Court reversed a defendant's murder conviction because of jury prejudice:
This Court has not yet decided that the fair administration of justice must be
subordinated to another safeguard of our constitutional system-freedom of the
press properly conceived. The Court has not yet decided that, while convictions
must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of jurors
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This comment will examine post-Nebraska Press cases in-
volving orders that restrict the flow of information concerning
judicial proceedings and will suggest standards that focus on
whether an indirect gag order inhibits media coverage of the judi-
cial process. After a brief discussion of Nebraska Press' reasoning
and its emphasis on the prior restraint doctrine, a survey of lower
court cases will demonstrate Nebraska Press has not prevented
judges from issuing orders that substantially impair press cover-
age of the judicial system. Finally, the comment will propose
procedural safeguards to protect the press' role as a monitor of
governmental abuses.
Nebraska Press involved the prosecution of Erwin Charles
Simants for the murder of six members of a small town Nebraska
family.' Local newspapers dedicated front page coverage to the
gruesome events of the alleged murders and sexual assaults, and
to Simants' confessions to his parents and law enforcement offi-
cers.' Because the town where the alleged murders occurred is a
community of 850, 7 potential jurors were few. Furthermore, Ne-
braska statutes limited the territorial scope of changes of venue
and the length of continuances.8 These factors combined to create
or potential jurors were poisoned, the prisoner is constitutionally protected in
plying his trade.
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). A few cases outside
of the broadcast setting have reached results in line with this theory, enforcing rules of
fairness in news presentation. See, e.g., Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 441 F.2d
1257 (7th Cir. 1971) (state university campus newspaper cannot reject advertisements
because of their editorial contents); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(high school principal cannot prevent school newspaper from publishing paid advertise-
ment opposing the Vietnam war despite an administrative policy limiting news items to
matters pertaining to the high school).
Some commentators also have advocated an enforceable right of access to the press,
arguing government has an obligation to ensure a wide variety of views reaches the public.
They maintain at the time of the enactment of the first amendment the press collectively
presented a broad range of opinions, but vast changes since that time have placed in a
few hands the power to shape public opinion. Elimination of competing newspapers in
many large cities and concentration of control of media have made it difficult for the
public to contribute in a meaningful way to the debate on issues. See generally Barron,
Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 H v. L. RFv. 1641 (1967); Lange,
The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review
and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1973).
5. Larson & Murphy, supra note 1, at 418.
6. Id. at 419.
7. 427 U.S. at 542.
8. Shellow, supra note 1, at 479, concludes the conflict the trial judge faced between
free press and fair trial rights was not in this case inherent in the Bill of Rights, but evolved
from these Nebraska statutes. Regardless of the constitutionality of the judge's restrictive
order, Shellow maintains legislative restraints deprived the judge of meaningful alterna-
tives to an order restraining publication.
320 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 2:317
profound practical problems for a trial judge seeking to assure
that a jury determines a defendant's guilt or innocence "only by
evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
influence whether of private talk or public print."9 Moreover, the
trial judge realized if prejudicial publicity prevented jury mem-
bers from fairly receiving and evaluating evidence, an appellate
court could overturn the conviction, thus necessitating a new
trial.'0 Faced with requests from both prosecution and defense to
restrain prejudicial pretrial publicity, the trial judge issued an
order proscribing publication of specified information." On re-
view, the Supreme Court sought to determine the scope of the
judiciary's power to limit freedom of the press.
The Court resolved the conflict between first amendment
2
and sixth amendment 3 rights" by holding that before entering a
9. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). The Nebraska Press Court, how-
ever, noted that pretrial publicity, even if pervasive and concentrated, does not necessarily
lead to an unfair trial. 427 U.S. at 565.
10. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
11. 427 U.S. at 542. The trial judge's order prohibited the news media from reporting:
(1) the existence or contents of a confession the defendant had made to law enforcement
officers; (2) the fact or nature of statements the defendant had made to other persons;
(3) contents of a note the defendant had written the night of the crime; (4) certain aspects
of the medical testimony at the preliminary hearing; and (5) the identity of the victims
of the alleged sexual assault and the nature of the assault. Id. at 544. Circuit Justice
Blackmun denied the press' first request for a stay. In response to the press' second
request, he granted a stay of portions of the state court order pending review by the
Nebraska Supreme Court. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1319 (Blackmun,
Circuit Justice, 1975). After the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the remaining restric-
tions, the media applied for a more extensive stay. The full court, Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stewart dissenting, and Justice White dissenting in part, similarly declined
to stay the portions of the order that were still in effect, or to accelerate review. Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1027 (1975) (mem.).
Not all commentators believe gag orders reduce prejudice among potential jurors.
Two defense attorneys have argued gag orders often work against criminal defendants, and
fairness to a defendant does not require limitations on freedom of the press. They suggest
instead extensive voir dire and increased preemptory challenges for the defense would
work to safeguard a defendant's sixth amendment rights. See generally Garry & Riordan,
supra note 1.
12. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. "Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
14. Free press and fair trial rights do not necessarily conflict. Some commentators
maintain the conflict is a "myth," Garry & Riordan, supra note 1, at 576, or that it is far
less common than a great deal of the literature suggests, Fenner & Koley, supra note 1,
at 446 n.16. See also Kaplan, Of Babies and Bathwater, 29 STAN. L. REv. 621, 623 (1977).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated the sixth amendment public trial provision, which
enables the public and press to attend judicial proceedings, serves to assure fair trials by
restraining possible abuses of judicial power. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268 (1948). See
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direct gag order a trial court must find other measures avoiding
a confrontation between these rights would be ineffective.'" Al-
though the Court noted "trial courts must take strong measures
to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the ac-
cused,"" it suggested lower courts use the techniques mentioned
in Sheppard v. Maxwell" as alternatives to gagging the press. 8
These include continuance, change of venue, voir dire, jury in-
structions, and participant gag orders. Thus, under Nebraska
Press' analysis, before gagging the press, a trial judge must both
find these alternatives would not mitigate the adverse effects of
pretrial publicity," and demonstrate a restraining order would
prevent the threatened harm.10
By allowing trial courts to issue direct gag orders only when
alternatives would not preserve a defendant's fair trial right, the
Court recognized the need for complete coverage of the judicial
process. Both Chief Justice Burger's majority and Justice Bren-
nan's concurring opinions noted that the press guards against
miscarriages of justice by subjecting police, prosecutors, and the
also note 81 infra. Judge Eric Younger, however, suggests although a strong distrust of
secret trials still pervades legal thinking, the legal community no longer views free press
and fair trial guarantees as allies or considers the press the guardian of the criminal
defendant. He does not attribute the change in attitude to a change in media style. Stating
"the roots of journalistic fervor" can be traced to the "beginnings of our national exist-
ence," Younger suggests the trend results from a coupling of two factors: the importance
of the jury system and technological advances that have made possible instantaneous
reproduction of events and constant exposure to the media. Younger, supra note 1, at 591-
94. For background information on the free press-fair trial controversy, see Schmidt, supra
note 1, at 432-55.
15. 427 U.S. at 569.
16. Id. at 553 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966)).
17. In Sheppard, the Court reversed the denial of Dr. Sam Sheppard's habeus corpus
petition, stating he had been denied a fair trial by the prejudicial effects of publicity, and
noting the "carnival atmosphere" caused by the trial judge's failure to control the court-
room. 384 U.S. at 358. For a discussion of Sheppard's impact on the free press-fair trial
conflict, see Portman, supra note 1.
18. 427 U.S. at 563-64.
19. Id. at 569. The Court seemed confident that alternatives would prove effective.
Although it did not cite any empirical studies to support its conclusion, some studies do
suggest courts can overcome initial prejudice by judicial instruction, the solemnity of the
situation and the sense of responsibility created thereby, prior commitment on voir dire
or a continuance to allow time for prejudice to dissipate. See generally H. KALvEN & H.
ZEisEL, THE AMEIcAN Jua" (1966); Simon, supra note 1. But see Schmidt, supra note 1,
at 449 (concluding results of empirical studies are inconsistent and experiments "fall too
far short of reality to provide convincing evidence").
Commentators disagree on the effectiveness of alternative techniques. Compare Lar-
son & Murphy, supra note 1 and Younger, The Sheppard Mandate Today: A Trial Judge's
Perspective, 56 NEa. L. Rav. 1 (1977) with Fahringer, Charting a Course from the Free
Press to a Fair Trial, 12 SutvoLK L. Rzv. 1 (1978) and Garry & Riordan, supra note 1.
20. 427 U.S. at 562.
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judicial system to public scrutiny.2 Furthermore, Justice Bren-
nan's opinion implicitly recognized the public's "right to know";
that is, a right to receive and actively acquire information.22 The
right to know extends first amendment coverage to receivers and
gatherers, as well as disseminators, of information: "[It would
be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no
buyers. 23 Justice Brennan stressed that increased exposure of the
judicial system through public criticism and debate can improve
the quality of the system;2 that is, the press ensures the integrity
of the judicial system by publishing news that readers, because
of limited time and resources, could not gather for themselves.
Thus, Nebraska Press acknowledged the press' crucial role, in
relation to both the judiciary and the public, of subjecting infor-
mation on judicial proceedings25 to public accountability.
To protect the press' role as a monitor of governmental
abuses," the Court used prior restraint analysis. All of the opin-
21. Id. at 560 (quoting from Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)); id. at
586-87 (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. The right presumes society's paramount interest should be in "an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail," Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969), because a free flow of information from which individuals
can make reasoned judgments is indispensable to a self-governing society. See generally
The First Amendment and the Right to Know: A Symposium, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1976);
Note, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977).
For cases recognizing the right to know, see, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (recognized public's right to information on the price of legal serv-
ices); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (right to know
what houses are for sale by viewing "for sale" signs defeated state interest in promoting
stable, integrated housing); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 (1975) (right to informa-
tion about availability of abortions); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408 (1973) (right
to receive mail from prisoners).
23. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). In Lamont, a statute conditioned delivery of mail from abroad containing commun-
ist literature upon a written request from the recipient. The Court held the statute vio-
lated the addressee's free speech right.
24. 427 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
25. Nebraska Press said information on judicial proceedings lies "near the core of the
first amendment." 427 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). See Landmark Communica-
tions Co. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19
(1966) (a major purpose of the first amendment is to protect free discussion of governmen-
tal affairs).
26. Other cases recognizing this role include Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to
bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice); Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J., concurring) (Court
is intensely skeptical about those measures that would allow government to insinuate
itself into the editorial rooms of the nation's press); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832
(1974) ("the constitutional guarantee of a free press 'assures the maintenance of our
political system and an open society' . . . and secures 'the paramount public interest in
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ions relied heavily on the prior restraint doctrine, 27 which imposes
a strong presumption against the constitutionality of formal pro-
hibitions on speech imposed in advance of utterance or publica-
tion. 8 The Supreme Court has authorized prior restraints only in"exceptional cases" because they not only destroy the immedi-
acy of intended communication, 30 but also are predetermined
prohibitions a violator cannot challenge even though a court later
adjudges the restraint unconstitutional. 3
a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials' ") (footnotes omitted);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (the press does not simply publish news
about trials but guards against miscarriages of justice).
For commentary recognizing the press' role as a check on governmental power, see
Bezanson, supra note 1; Fahringer, supra note 19, at 4; Stewart, supra note 4.
27. Chief Justice Burger noted although there are marked differences between the
order entered in Nebraska Press and other cases involving prior restraints on publication,"as to the underlying issue-the right of the press to be free from prior restraints on
publication-those cases form the backdrop against which we must decide this case." 427
U.S. at 561-62 (emphasis in original). The majority opinion, id. at 569, and Justice Pow-
ell's concurring opinion, id. at 571, stressed the problems inherent in meeting the heavy
burden of demonstrating before trial the necessity of a gag order, but did not rule out the
possibility of such an order. The concurring opinions of Justices White, id. at 570-71,
Brennan, id. at 594, and Stevens, id. at 617, however, emphasized the almost insuperable
presumption against the constitutionality of prior restraints. See note 29 infra.
28. Litwack, The Doctrine of Prior Restraints, 12 HAxv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 519, 520
(1977). See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam);
Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1968).
29. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). Despite the heavy presumption
against the constitutionality of prior restraints, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin recently granted an injunction barring publication of an
article describing the operation of a hydrogen bomb. United States v. The Progressive, 47
U.S.L.W. 1153 (W.D. Wis. April 10, 1979). The court stated that although first amend-
ment rights have an honored place in the constitutional scheme, it could find no plausible
reason for the public to know the technical details of hydrogen bomb construction. Id.
In Near, the Court gave three illustrations of "exceptional cases" when prior re-
straints might be permissible: 1.) restraints during wartime to prevent disclosure of mili-
tary developments or obstruction of the military effort; 2.) enforcement of obscenity laws;
and 3.) enforcement of laws against incitement of acts of violence or revolution. The
restraint in the Progressive case may fall into the "military security" exception. The
Supreme Court has also suggested a trial judge may restrain publication to preserve a
defendant's right to a fair trial:
Despite the fact that newsgathering may be hampered, the prss is regularly
excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of
other official bodies gathered in executive session, and the meetings of private
organizations. Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of
crime or disaster when the general public is excluded, and they may be prohib-
ited from attending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions
are necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972) (emphasis added).
30. See Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968);
A. BICKEL, THE MOiuirrv OF CONSENT 61 (1975).
31. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). See United States v. Dickin-
son, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973). In Dickinson, two
newsmen who violated a judge's order that "no reporting taken in this case today shall
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Although the prior restraint doctrine appears to provide far-
reaching protection, in fact it does not protect adequately the
press' role. Prior restraint analysis emphasizes the form of the
restraint rather than its effect. Although it prohibits restrictions
prior to communication, the doctrine places no restrictions on
other types of governmental action that can curtail significantly
the dissemination of information and ideas.3 2 The prior restraint
doctrine allows courts to seal records or close judicial proceedings
entirely because these orders do not directly restrain utterance or
publication. 3 Furthermore, the doctrine allows orders gagging
be made" were guilty of criminal contempt even though the Fifth Circuit held the order
unconstitutional. Regarding the reasons for the criminal contempt exception requiring
compliance with court orders while invalid non-judicial directives may be disregarded, the
court said:
Disobedience to a legislative pronouncement in no way interferes with the legis-
lature's ability to discharge its responsibilities (passing laws). The dispute is
simply pursued in the judiciary and the legislature is ordinarily free to continue
its function unencumbered by any burdens resulting from the disregard of its
directives. Similarly, law enforcement is not prevented by failure to convict
those who disregard the unconstitutional commands of a policeman.
On the other hand, the deliberate refusal to obey an order of the court
without taking it through the established processes requires further action by
the judiciary, and therefore directly affects the judiciary's ability to discharge
its duties and responsibilities. Therefore, while it is sparingly to be used, yet the
power of courts to punish for contempt is a necessary part of the independence
of the judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the duties
imposed on them by law ...
Id. at 510 (quoting from Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911)).
32. Many commentators maintain courts should apply heightened scrutiny to prior
restraints because that type of restraint deters more expression and is more unfair than
other types of restrictions. Alexander Bickel writes:
Prior restraints fall on speech with a brutality and a finality all their own. Even
if they are ultimately lifted they cause irremediable loss-a loss in the immedi-
acy, the impact, of speech. They differ from the imposition of criminal liability
in significant procedural aspects as well, which in turn have their substantive
consequences. The violator of a prior restraint may be assured of being held in
contempt; the violator of a statute punishing speech criminally knows that he
will go before a jury, and may be willing to take his chance, counting on a
possible acquittal. A prior restraint, therefore, stops more speech more effec-
tively. A criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes.
A. BICKEL, supra note 30, at 61. See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 406 (1970). Other commentators have suggested expanding the prior restraint
concept to include other types of governmental restrictions that significantly curtail the
dissemination of information and ideas. See generally Litwack, supra note 28; Murphy,
The Prior Restraint Doctrine in the Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 51 Noise DAME LAw.
898 (1976).
33. See United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1208 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 968 (1978); In re Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 783, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821,
824 (1977); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 502, 387 A.2d 425, 432
(1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-155 (U.S. July 27, 1978).
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trial participants because, unlike prior restraints, a violator can
challenge these orders. 4 Press coverage of the judicial system
provides information of legitimate public concern. 3 To enable the
press to perform its role in relation to the judiciary and the pub-
lic, procedural safeguards should precede any governmental in-
terference with the press' first amendment rights, regardless of
whether the interference technically is a prior restraint. Nebr'aska
Press, unfortunately, did not articulate a principle applicable to
orders that technically are not prior restraints, and thus failed to
protect adequately the public's first amendment right to receive
useful information.3 6
Post-Nebraska Press cases involving gag orders in the trial
context demonstrate that prior restraint analysis inadequately
protects the flow of information concerning judicial proceedings.
The orders in these cases are of three types: first, orders prevent-
ing publication of information on the public record or orders fail-
ing to satisfy Nebraska Press standards; second, orders gagging
witnesses, parties' attorneys, or other trial participants; and
third, orders withholding information from both the public and
press. Definitive standards govern issuance of orders in the first
category: courts cannot prevent the press from publishing factual
materials from judicial records, 7 and if courts directly gag the
34. See, e.g., Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 150, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 233
(1973) (court overturned district attorney's contempt conviction for violation of a partici-
pant gag order because his statement did not prejudice the pending criminal prosecution).
In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 912 (1976), the Seventh Circuit distinguished between a court acting in its legislative
role and its adjudicative role when it stated court rules limiting attorney comment but
allowing challenge by the violator are not prior restraints. Id. at 247-48.
35. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("the commission of
crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and the judicial proceedings arising from the prose-
cutions . . . are without question of legitimate public concern and are thus constitution-
ally protected").
36. The Court has observed the first amendment serves to protect "the free flow of
information," Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1978), and the "unfettered exchange of ideas," Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957), concerning "all issues about which information is needed
or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
period." Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (quoting from Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)). See, e.g., Linmark Assocs. Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85 (1977); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). See generally
Meiklejohn, Public Speech in the Supreme Court Since New York Times v. Sullivan, 26
SvRAcusE L. Rav. 819 (1975).
37. See Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Ct. for Okla. County, 430 U.S. 308
(1977) (order restraining media from publishing name of juvenile learned during court
proceedings open to the public). Although the press has no greater rights than does the
general public to gather news, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), the press can publish
material from public records, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). But
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press, they must meet the Nebraska Press standards.3 8 Yet out-
side these areas, standards are far less clear.
When a court gags trial participants rather than the press, a
significant threshold problem involves the press' standing to chal-
lenge the order. In two recent cases, 39 the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina refused to grant the press
standing to appeal gag orders on trial participants. The district
court said the press does not have a personal stake in the outcome
of a participant gag order because the order does not directly
restrain publication. ° Reasoning that the first amendment does
not guarantee the press a constitutional right of access to infor-
mation unavailable to the general public, the court concluded
that if the information is not public, the press has no first amend-
ment right to gather it." Although the Fourth Circuit eventually
granted the press standing, the press could not appeal the order
see Note, First Amendment Limitations on Public Disclosure Actions, 45 U. CH. L. REv.
180 (1977) (an action for truthful public disclosure of private facts is constitutionally
maintainable when disclosure of unnewsworthy private facts on the public record seriously
harm the plaintiff's reasonable sense of individual dignity and the defendant is fairly
chargeable with cognizance of the dignitary harm caused by the disclosure).
38. No court has held an order met Nebraska Press standards. See Des Moines
Register and Tribune v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1976) (order restraining publi-
cation of jurors' names); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. Marullo, 334 So. 2d 426 (La.
1976) (order restraining publication of jurors' names). Some commentators have suggested
the practical impact of Nebraska Press's high standard is to outlaw all prior restraints in
the free press-fair trial context. See Larson & Murphy, supra note 1, at 443; Sack, supra
note 1, at 414.
39. Central S.C. Chapter of Prof. Journ. v. United States D.C. of S.C., 551 F.2d 559
(4th Cir. 1977); Central S.C. Chapter of Prof. Journ. v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182
(D.S.C.), aff'd, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1102 (1978). See also
Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, - Haw. - , _., 580 P.2d 49, 58 (1978) ("to
permit a third party to intervene would unnecessarily encumber pending litigation and
invite the entry of non-parties when the right or interest sought to be enforced is not
directly involved in the subject matter of the pending proceeding"); Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 495, 387 A.2d 425, 429-30 (1978), appeal docketed, No.
78-155 (U.S. July 27, 1978) (court denied press' petitions for writs of mandamus requested
after trial judges refused to grant the press standing to appeal orders closing pretrial
suppression hearings).
40. 431 F. Supp. at 1186.
41. Id. at 1187. The court applied the test for standing established in Data Processing
Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Under Data Processing: 1) the plaintiff must have
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy; and 2) the interest plaintiff seeks to
protect must be within the zone of interests the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question protects. In recent cases, the Supreme Court has applied more restrictive stand-
ing requirements. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Caroline Environmental Study Group, 98
S. Ct. 2620 (1978) (used a two-prong test requiring injury in fact and a substantial likeli-
hood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury). See
generally Tushnett, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 ComRELL L.
REv. 663 (1977).
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for several months. 42
Other courts granting the press standing to appeal partici-
pant gag orders recognize such orders deny the press access to
potential sources of information even though they do not directly
limit the press' activity. 3 Although trial participants may choose
not to speak to news reporters, participant orders deny them the
opportunity to make that choice. If the press has no sources from
which to obtain news, the right to gather and publish news is
meaningless. 4 Vague, overbroad participant orders not only in-
fringe protected speech of trial participants, but also impair the
press' right to gather that protected speech and publish it in the
form of news.45 The press, therefore, does have a personal stake
in the outcome of a participant gag order and should have stand-
ing to challenge it. Nebraska Press' narrow prior restraint analy-
sis, however, neither defines the press' constitutional rights46 nor
protects the press' role as a check on governmental power; it
merely invalidates one method of restraining the press and leaves
42. In September 1976, the press appealed an order issued by a district court judge
prior to a South Carolina state senator's trial on criminal charges. The order prohibited
extrajudicial statements by participants that "might divulge prejudicial matter not of
public record," prevented jurors, trial participants, and officials from mingling with news
reporters around the courthouse, and prohibited witnesses from giving interviews. The
Fourth Circuit denied the press standing in January 1977. Central S.C. Chapter of Prof.
Journ. v. United States D.C. of S.C., 551 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1977). The press sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against the order, but in May 1978, the district court
would not grant the press standing. Central S.C. Chapter of Prof. Journ. v. Martin, 431
F. Supp. 1182 (D.S.C. 1977). Later in May, the Fourth Circuit granted the press standing
but upheld all portions of the order except that part preventing participants from mingling
with the press. Central S.C. Chapter of Prof. Journ. v. Martin, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1102 (1978).
43. C.B.S., Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); Northwest Publications Inc.
v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1977); State ex rel. Beacon Publishing Co. v. Kain-
rad, 46 Ohio St. 2d 349, 348 N.E.2d 695 (1976).
44. Judge Michael Musmanno expressed the point as follows:
Freedom of the press is not restricted to the operation of linotype machines and
printing presses. A rotary press needs raw material like a flour mill needs wheat.
A print shop without material to print would be as meaningless as a vineyard
without grapes, an orchard without trees or a lawn without verdure.
Freedom of the press means freedom to gather news, write it, publish it and
circulate it. When any of these integral operations is interdicted, freedom of the
press becomes a river without water.
In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 273, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957).
45. See text accompanying notes 47-70 infra.
46. Murphy, supra note 32, at 900. Murphy maintains because the doctrine does not
define the substantive rights protected under the first amendment its application "tends
to truncate constitutional development and foster ambiguity." He suggests the prior re-
straint doctrine causes uncertainty in the formulation of governmental restrictions and in
determinations by private parties of the safe limits for their expression.
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others, such as denying the press standing to challenge partici-
pant gag orders, open.
Another question Nebraska Press left unanswered involves
the standard trial courts should apply in gagging trial partici-
pants. Because most courts read the decision to allow judicially
imposed restraints on trial participants,47 they have developed
standards governing their issuance. Most courts require a show-
ing that participant comments would create a reasonable likeli-
hood of tending to prevent a fair trial.48 The Supreme Court im-
pliedly adopted this standard in Sheppard v. Maxwell49 when it
listed the use of participant gag orders as one alternative to miti-
gate the effects of adverse publicity preferable to gagging the
press 1 Proponents of the reasonable likelihood standard argue
the test is "honest" in that it allows trial judges to consider many
uncertain factors that may combine to prevent a fair trial." Be-
cause the judge does not know where the trial will be held or how
much attention it will attract, the reasonable likelihood test gives
the judge discretion to take all the future variants into considera-
tion and fashion an order limiting participant comments before
those comments seriously endanger a defendant's fair trial right. 5
The reasonable likelihood standard, however, does not provide
47. Central S.C. Chapter of Prof. Journ. v. United States D.C. of S.C., 551 F.2d 559
(4th Cir. 1977); State v. Carter, 143 N.J. Super. 405, 363 A.2d 369 (1976); People v.
Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 780, 388 N.Y.S. 2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1976). But see Commonwealth v.
Casper, 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 12, 375 A.2d 737 (1977) (Nebraska Press placed propriety of
orders governing extrajudicial statements by parties and witnesses in grave doubt.).
48. Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Carter, 143 N.J. Super.
405, 363 A.2d 366 (1976); People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 780, 388 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct.
1976).
49. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
50. Id. at 363-64. The Sheppard Court used the "reasonable likelihood" phrase only
once, and not in connection with restraints on free expression: "[Wihere there is a
reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge
should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so
permeated with publicity." Id. at 363. Some commentators suggest because Sheppard did
not use the "reasonable likelihood" language in connection with participant gag orders,
it intended no retreat from the clear and present danger test it has consistently applied
in cases involving first amendment restrictions. See Note, Silence Orders-Preserving
Political Expression by Defendants and Their Lawyers, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 595,
605 (1971). The Sheppard Court, however, preferred the participant order suggestion and
set that technique apart from the recommended devices list. It is unlikely the Court would
require a higher standard of danger for using the preferred remedy than for using the
others. Younger, supra note 19, at 11.
51. Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 164, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 242 (1973).
Although this comment examines post-Nebraska Press cases and the California court
decided this case before Nebraska Press, the Younger opinion articulates well the rationale
behind the reasonable likelihood standard.
52. Id. at 160, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
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participants with adequate warning of what types of comments
are impermissible. Participants determining what statements are
reasonably likely to prevent a fair trial may differ as to applica-
tion of the vague standard and restrict their conduct to that
which is unquestionably safe. Many statements they predict to
be reasonably likely to interfere may in fact not interfere at all.
Thus, the standard provides inadequate protection for partici-
pants' first amendment rights because an order incorporating the
standard may make participants overly cautious of saying any-
thing concerning a case. 3
Some courts, however, have adopted standards even lower
than reasonable likelihood. These courts hold participant gag
orders permissible when the speech "tends" 5 or is "likely" 55 to
prevent a fair trial. The West Virginia Supreme Court" urged a''common sense" rule, suggesting police and prosecutors "never
discuss a case with the press any time before the verdict," and
make "no comment of any sort on any subject before trial."57
These standards inhibit drastically full and adequate reporting
on the judiciary. Furthermore, after Nebraska Press, the United
States Supreme Court refused to consider a case presenting the
issue of attorney gag rules in the free press-fair trial context,58 and
thus implicitly sanctioned the presently existing wide range of
standards. Although Nebraska Press described the press as the
"handmaiden of effective judicial administration,""5 the Court's
subsequent acceptance of this wide range of standards seriously
compromises the press' role.
The Seventh Circuit has accomplished the goals of partici-
pant gag orders-retaining the integrity of the judicial system
while promoting free speech and press coverage-by adopting a
clear, precise, and narrowly drawn standard. 0 The standard pro-
53. As the Court stated in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1962): "These [first
amendment] freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions." Id. at 433.
54. In re Porter, 268 Or. 417, 521 P.2d 345, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); In re
Sawyer, 260 F.2d 189, rev'd, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
55. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 387 A.2d 425, 431 (1978),
appeal docketed, No. 78-155 (U.S. July 27, 1978).
56. State v. Sette, - W.Va. ., 242 S.E.2d 464 (1978).
57. Id. at -, 242 S.E.2d at 472.
58. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976). The Court had refused to hear the issue earlier also. See In re Porter,
268 Or. 417, 521 P.2d 345, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974).
59. 427 U.S. at 560 (quoting from Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 350 (1966)); 427
U.S. at 586-87 (Brennan, J., concurring).
60. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
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scribes speech posing "a serious and imminent threat of interfer-
ence with the fair administration of justice."'" Under the reason-
able likelihood test, the trial judge possesses almost unfettered
discretion in determining what comments, however trivial or
innocuous, violate the order. In contradistinction, the Seventh
Circuit requires a more principled approach to such a judicial
determination; not only is the very scope of the order more
limited, it inherently appears to require some measure of arti-
culated judicial justification to sustain a violation of the order.
The Seventh Circuit's approach allows participants greater
latitude to determine what types of comment would prevent the
trier of fact from fairly evaluating the evidence presented in
court, thus enabling them to gauge when their speech is pro-
tected. Its redefinition of the area of acceptable comment gives
more warning of what actions are impermissible and thus fosters
dissemination of information that would not endanger a fair
trial.6 2 The right to a fair trial is fundamental; 3 issues of law and
427 U.S. 912 (1976). The Sixth Circuit adopted an identical standard in CBS, Inc. v.
Young, 522 F.2d 234 (1975). See notes 66-69 infra.
61. This is the test of traditional first amendment speech cases although the Supreme
Court has restated the standard since formulating it in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919). See Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to
Brandenburg-And Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41. The ABA, however, adopted the lower
"reasonable likelihood" standard for attorneys. ADvisoay COMMrrEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND
FREE PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-STANDARDS
RELATING To FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 74-75 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited
as the REARDON REPORT]: Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System
on the "Fair Trial-Free Press" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 406 (1968) [hereinafter cited as the
Kaufman Report]. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility also limits an attorney's
speech if it is "reasonably likely" to interfere with the administration of justice. ABA CODE
ov PROFE sSIONAL RESPONSxBLITY DR 7-107 (A) - (H). Although the Kaufman Report does
not discuss the standard at all and the REARDON REFoRT does not deal with it in any depth,
apparently relying on Sheppard's use of "reasonable likelihood," the reports' rationale was
that defendant's right to a fair trial outweighs attorneys' rights to make possible prejudi-
cial statements. Kaufman Report, supra, at 406.
Several courts have suggested a layman-attorney distinction, arguing laymen can
publicly criticize the administration of justice but lawyers should be bound by higher
standards of conduct and their criticism should be more restrained. See In re Woodward,
300 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1957) (en banc); In re Raggio, 87 Nev. 369, 487 P.2d 499 (1971); In
re Gerouch, 76 S.D. 191, 75 N.W.2d 644 (1956); In re Simmons, 65 Wash. 2d 88, 395 P.2d
1013 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
62. The serious and imminent threat standard also accords with the Supreme Court's
reluctance to impose sanctions where the speech involved has serious political value. See
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964). The Supreme Court held
the social and political importance of comment on matters of public concern is so strong
as to require a showing of "malice" before a court can render a libel judgment against a
publisher.
63. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) ("trial by jury in criminal
cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice"); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955) ("a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process").
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fact in a judicial proceeding must be resolved on the basis of
evidence admitted in court, not in the media." Yet equally funda-
mental are the rights of all participants to exercise their first
amendment rights, of the press to publish news on the judicial
system, and of the public to obtain information on the workings
of that system. The serious and imminent threat standard allows
courts to protect proceedings from prejudicial interference with-
out placing unnecessary limitations on first amendment free-
doms."5
Additionally, after a trial court finds a participant order nec-
essary under the serious and imminent threat standard, the judge
must precisely tailor its scope to the needs of the case. In CBS,
Inc. v. Young,6" an order prevented all parties concerned with the
litigation and "their relatives, close friends, and associates" from
discussing the case "in any manner whatsoever" with the media. 67
64. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941) ("legal trials, are not like elections
tobe won through the use of the meeting hall, the radio, and the newspaper").
65. "[Tlhe limitation of first amendment freedoms must be no greater than is neces-
sary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." Pro-
cunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). See also Carroll v. President and Comm'rs
of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
66. 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
67. Id. at 236. The Sixth Circuit granted the press standing to appeal the order, id.
at 238, and held the order unconstitutional because there was not substantial evidence
that publicity had created a clear and imminent danger to the fair administration of
justice. Id. at 240.
The CBS order gagged a number of private persons. Although the REARDON REPORT
placed restrictions on comments by attorneys and law enforcement officers, it did not
recommend any general restrictions on private persons. The REPor suggested there is no
widely demonstrated need for a prohibition on private persons, and the prohibition could
raise constitutional questions. REARDON RZMrr, supra note 63, at 142. Nevertheless, trial
judges have often issued gag orders that cover large numbers of private persons. See, e.g.,
Hamilton v. Municipal Court, 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168, cert. denied, 396
U.S. 985 (1969). In Hamilton, the California Court of Appeals upheld a trial judge's order
gagging all parties, their counsel, all law enforcement officers, the regents, employees, and
agents of a university and all of the university students. The reviewing court reasoned the
order complied with the Supreme Court's mandate in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1968), that trial judges utilize alternatives such as gagging trial participants to preserve
a fair trial rather than gagging the press. Id. at 802, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 171. See notes 17-22
supra and accompanying text. See also King v. Jones, 319 F. Supp. 653 (N.D. Ohio 1970);
State v. Schmid, 109 Ariz. 349, 354, 509 P.2d 619, 624 (1973). See generally Warren &
Abell, Free Press-Fair Trial: The "Gag Order," A California Aberration, 45 S. CAL. L.
Rav. 51 (1972).
Some commentators suggest gag orders should not cover criminal defendants. They
maintain pretrial publicity by a defendant does not prejudice a prosecutor's case. The
sixth amendment guarantees a fair trial to the defendant, not the state. Moreover, the
accused has a right to reply publicly to the prosecutor's charges. See generally Freedman
& Starwood, supra note 1; Note, Gag Orders on Criminal Defendants, 27 HASTINGs L.J.
1369 (1976).
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The order was vague because it did not sufficiently identify "close
friends" or "associates" of the litigants. Because the line between
innocent and condemned conduct becomes guesswork when an
order uses such indefinite terms, the order may have prevented
many people from saying anything about the case for fear of
contempt charges. Further, by prohibiting anyone associated
with the case from discussing it "in any manner whatsoever," the
order prevented people from making tangential comments having
no tendency to prevent a fair trial. Thus, the order was overbroad
because the government's interest is merely to limit speech that
prevents a fair trial."8 Such an order infringes on first amendment
rights unnecessarily by drastically limiting access to news
sources.6 9
Private litigation often affects important areas of public con-
cern, and trial participants are a crucial source of information
and opinion on issues involved in the case. Orders directed at trial
participants, however, arguably are not prior restraints because
68. Although vagueness and overbreadth are similar in their deterrence of protected
expression, the concepts are distinct. As a matter of due process, a law is void on its face
if it is so vague that persons of "common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application . . . ." Conally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926) (statute imposing fines or imprisonment upon contractors who paid their workmen
less than the "current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed"
held void for uncertainty). See generally Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rv. 67 (1960). An overbroad law is one that "does not aim
specifically at evils within the allowable area of government control, but . . . sweeps
within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise" of
protected expressive or associational rights. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)
(statute prohibiting all picketing void on its face because it banned peaceful picketing
protected by the first amendment). See generally Note, The First Amendment Over-
breadth Doctrine, 83 HAv. L. REv. 844 (1970).
69. By limiting access to potential news sources, a vague, overbroad participant order
creates an information vacuum that may lead the press to seek out sources less responsible
than attorneys and public officials. In an article in the ABA Journal, Evelle Younger,
district attorney for Los Angeles County, explained how this can happen. Before the trial
of Sirhan Sirhan for the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, the trial judge issued a
sweeping participant gag order. When a young woman announced she had seen a girl in a
polka-dot dress saying, "we got Kennedy," run from the assassination scene with two
foreign looking males, the press sought out the woman who had seen the girl in the polka-
dot dress. The media broadcast and printed her statement nationwide. Actually, she had
fabricated the story, but because the order was so broad, its wording prohibited the
district attorney from even explaining the account was untrue. Further, when the press
asked the district attorney questions like, "Is it true President Nasser was behind the
assassination?," he could only respond with "no comment." This left the impression there
might have been evidence of Nasser's involvement when in fact there was not, and
Younger suggests it would not have impaired Sirhan's right to a fair trial for the attorney
to have said, "no, there is no evidence of that." Thus, the order not only limited accurate
reporting on the judicial system, but also generated speculation and false rumors.
Younger, Fair Trial, Free Press and the Man in the Middle, 56 A.B.A.J. 127, 129 (1970).
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one prosecuted for violating them can appeal.7 0 They also are not
direct restraints on the press. Therefore, Nebraska Press' prior
restraint analysis provides no standards for trial judges issuing
orders silencing trial participants. Nevertheless, participant or-
ders that neither incorporate the serious and imminent threat
standard nor fit the specific needs of a case impermissibly limit
the publication of accurate information about the judicial pro-
cess. Because courts have not developed definitive standards that
protect the press' and public's first amendment rights, trial
judges often have issued participant gag orders that inhibit media
coverage and thus curtail dissemination of inforination critical to
a government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the
proper conduct of public business.
A lack of definitive standards also has resulted in trial judges
applying inconsistent standards when withholding information
from the public and press. Attempting to preserve the integrity
of judicial proceedings, judges often seal records or close proceed-
ings. Because the press' right to gather news is no greater than
the public's,7 orders limiting information available to the public
also limit the press' access to that information. Although the
Supreme Court in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn12 held that
once information is on the public record the press may publish
it, the Court avoided the broader issue of how much information
trial courts can keep off the record. Unfortunately, Nebraska
Press did not clarify matters.
Because Nebraska Press emphasized the form of an order
rather than its substance, the decision provides no guidance to
trial judges who must determine when and what they may with-
hold from the public. Sometimes with no discussion of limits or
alternatives, appellate courts in post-Nebraska Press cases have
allowed trial judges broad discretion to seal records,' 3 close por-
tions of judicial proceedings," and limit access to information.
75
These courts reason Nebraska Press is inapplicable because acts
70. See Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 151, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 233-34 (1973).
71. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
72. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
73. Gannett Co. v. Burke, 551 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal.
App. 3d 777, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1977).
74. Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87, 553 S.W.2d 270 (1977); Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544 (1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978);
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct., 468 Pa. 382, 363 A.2d 779
(1976).
75. United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968
(1978).
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of sealing records and closing proceedings are not directed at, and
thus technically are not prior restraints on, the press.7"
Absence of standards governing the withholding of informa-
tion gives judges great discretion to censor information of signifi-
cant public interest. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Discipli-
nary Board of the Supreme Court," the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court upheld a trial judge's decision to conduct a disbarred attor-
ney's reinstatement hearing in secret, because the supreme court
believed opening the procedure would serve only to embarrass the
attorney and would not benefit the public." Similarly, the New
York Court of Appeals in Gannett v. DePasquale5 recently con-
doned an order closing a pretrial suppression hearing to the pub-
lic without making the defendants in the murder case establish
prejudice. The court said the public's concern about judicial and
prosecutorial accountability did not rise to a legitimate level be-
cause any irregularities in earlier proceedings occurred out of
state .8
76. United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1208 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Estate of
Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 783, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821,824 (1977); Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 502, 387 A.2d 425, 432 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-155
(U.S. July 27, 1978). Some courts, however, have treated orders sealing records and closing
proceedings as prior restraints and used Nebraska Press' test to determine their validity
Gannett Co. v. Burke, 551 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, Circuit J., dissenting); Gannett
Pacific Corp. v. Richardson,__ Haw. -, 580 P.2d 49 (1978); Northwest Publications,
Inc. v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1977); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v.
Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976). For a discussion concluding the
distinction between indirect restraints via closing the courtroom and direct restraints via
gag orders on the press exalts form over substance, see Fenner & Koley, supra note 1, at
471-73.
77. 468 Pa. 382, 363 A.2d 779 (1976)..
78. The attorney petitioning for reinstatement had pled guilty to twelve counts of
federal securities fraud involving 1.5 million dollars. Id. at 388, 363 A.2d at 782. The
dissent argued because the criminal activity that led to the attorney's disbarment is part
of the public record and reinstatement hearings are an integral part of a court's obligation
to supervise the judicial system, the hearings are public business. Id. at 388, 363 A.2d at
782 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
79. 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544 (1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
80. See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 387 A.2d 425
(1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-155 (U.S. July 27, 1978) (rules closing pretrial suppression
hearing to the public at defendant's request held constitutional). Nebraska Press left open
the question of the constitutionality of closing pretrial proceedings with the defendant's
consent. 427 U.S. at 564 n.8 & 584 n.l (Brennan, J., concurring). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Gannett, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978), and heard oral arguments, 47
U.S.L.W. 3325 (1978). Counsel for Gannett argued the sixth amendment's public trial
clause and the first amendment require suppression hearings be open to the public unless
the defendant establishes, using Nebraska Press' standard for direct gag orders, publica-
tion of what occurred at the hearing will prejudice his or her case. Id. at 3325-26. Counsel
for Judge DePasquale and the defendants in the murder case stated "if there is any
constitutional absolute, it is the accused's right to a fair trial, and anything that would
truncate this right must be avoided." Id. at 3326.
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These decisions are deficient in several respects. First, the
sixth amendment's public trial provision does not allow a judge
to close the courtroom merely by determining the public's inter-
est does not rise to a significant level. In fact, the Supreme Court
has suggested the right to a public trial belongs not only to the
accused, but to the public, because the right serves to restrain
possible abuses of judicial power by limiting a judge's discretion
to close the courtroom.81 Second, the "legitimate level" standard
81. See, e.g., Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 352 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Mich. 1973); United States ex rel. Mayberry v.
Yeager, 321 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1971); CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCli SERVICE, THE CONST.
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPRErATION, S. Doc. No. 92-82, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess, amend. VI 1200 (1973) ("it appears that while it is possible to exclude some
persons from the courtroom, it is not permittible to bar wholly the public and the press,
either with or without the concurrence of the defendant") (footnotes omitted). The pub-
lic's right to a public trial is reinforced by the lack of a contrary right on behalf of the
criminal defendant. Although a defendant, under some circumstances, can waive his
constitutional right to a public trial, he has no absolute right to compel a private trial.
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965).
Further, in explaining the Anglo-American distrust for secret trials, the Court, in In
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), did not suggest the right to a public trial attaches only when
a trial judge perceives public interest has risen to a certain level, but observed the right
serves to restrain possible abuses of judicial power:
The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been variously
ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, to the
excesses of the English court of the Star Chamber, and the French monarchy's
abuse of the lettre de cachet. All of these institutions obviously symbolize a
menace to liberty. In the hands of despotic groups each of them had become an
instrument for the suppression of political and religious heresies in ruthless
disregard of the accused to a fair trial. Whatever other benefits the guarantee
to an accused that his trial be conducted in a public way may confer upon our
society, the guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any
attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that
every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public
opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.
Id. at 268-70. In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), the Court noted a public trial
improves the quality of testimony, may induce unknown witnesses to come forward with
relevant testimony, moves trial participants to perform their duties conscientiously, and
gives the public the opportunity to observe the courts' performance of their duties and to
determine whether they are performing adequately. Id. at 583. These benefits derived from
a public trial are not dependent necessarily on a public interest rising above the level of
curiosity, as the Gannett court suggested it must.
Although the Gannett court closed a suppression hearing rather than a trial, some
courts have suggested the right to a public trial attaches at the suppression hearing
"because of the importance of providing an opportunity for the public to observe judicial
proceedings at which the conduct of enforcement officials is questioned . . . rather than
permit[ting] such crucial steps in the criminal process to become associated with se-
crecy." United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1973); accord, e.g., United
States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Lopez, 328
F. Supp. 1077, 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). But see Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome,
478 Pa. 484, 505, 387 A.2d 425, 436 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-155 (U.S. July 27, 1978)
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is too vague, providing insufficient protection for the press' and
public's first amendment rights.2 Finally, the decisions seem to
require the media to prove the public's concern measures up to
the vague standard. Yet as Justice Brennan noted in staying por-
tions of the Nebraska Press trial judge's order, those requesting
the restraint bear the burden of demonstrating publication of
particular facts will irreparably impair the ability of jurors to
reach an independent and impartial judgment."3 Because an
order closing the courtroom infringes first amendment rights and,
in effect, operates as a prior restraint on the press, the burden of
proof in these cases should rest on those requesting closure.84
Gannett and Philadelphia Newspapers also fail to recognize
the unique role of a judge who enters a closure order. Normally a
court is brought into a dispute as a neutral third party. In these
cases, however, the court and the press are adversaries because
the court is preventing the press from reporting the court's work-
ings.8 5 The trial judge's involvement in the proceedings may
lessen the court's detachment and neutrality. The potential for
excessive and arbitrary withholding of information exists because
judges sometimes must determine whether to allow publication
of information reflecting on their own competence. Moreover, if
prosecution and defense both request a closed proceeding, the
trial judge becomes the "sole guardian of first amendment
[media] interests,"86 which interests conflict with the express
wishes of both parties to the litigation. This places a tremendous
(pretrial suppression hearing will be held in private at defendant's request because "most
damaging of all information from outside the courtroom" comes from these hearings and
public's interest in avoiding unfair trials outweighs its interest in access).
82. See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
83. 423 U.S. at 1333 (1975) (Blackmun, J., Circuit Justice). Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court has held the burden of proof should operate to decide close cases in favor of
the speech being protected. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). See Monaghan, First
Amendment "Due Process," 83 HAv. L. Rav. 518, 546 (1970).
84. See Fenner & Koley, supra note 1, at 493-94.
85. Id. at 456-57.
86. Younger, supra note 19, at 6-7.
Fenner and Koley describe the situation as follows:
The defense attorney is, of course, single minded in his regard for his client's
interest; a good deal of the time this means the less publicity the better, whether
truly out of fair trial concerns or simply to save the client's face. The prosecutor
is interested in a conviction which will stand on appeal; currently, reversal of a
conviction because of prejudicial publicity although extremely rare, constitutes
a real possibility, while reversal of a conviction for infringement of the media's
rights, of course remains unheard of.
Fenner & Koley, supra note 1, at 456 (emphasis in original).
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emotional and intellectual burden on the trial judge. 81 Unless
adequate procedural devices govern issuance of these types of
orders, this burden, combined with a lack of neutrality, could
result in orders closing proceedings when less restrictive means
would effectively mitigate prejudice.
Courts have failed not only to articulate standards for orders
withholding information, but also to delineate the permissible
scope of closure orders. An Arkansas trial judge conducted voir
dire in his chambers.8 8 Similarly, the Second Circuit upheld a
trial judge's order sealing all files in three pending criminal cases
and issued no opinion explaining why the ordel was necessary.8
Such orders, like orders gagging trial participants, do not
directly restrain the press because the news media are free to
try to obtain the information from other sources. Yet few sources
can provide an accurate and detailed account of a judicial pro-
ceeding, particularly if the judge also gags trial participants.
Thus, without clear standards governing when closure orders are
appropriate and what trial courts can withhold, such orders can
curtail severely the press' access to information. Even if the court
provides a transcript after a trial is over, it is a poor substitute
for actually observing the event. 0 Furthermore, when the trial is
over, public interest may have dissipated and the proceeding will
no longer be newsworthy."
87. Younger states that "[emotionally and intellectually, the burden on a trial
judge who is asked to go counter to the wishes of a defendant in a capital case on a major
constitutional point where the state joins in the defense position is almost unbelieveable."
Younger, supra note 19, at 6-7 (emphasis in original).
88. Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 85, 553 S.W.2d 270 (1977). Although
the state supreme court invalidated the judge's order, the court ignored both respondents'
assertion of the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial and petitioners' assertion
of their first amendment right of freedom of the press. The court relied instead on the
substantial public interest in keeping all portions of a criminal trial open, but did not
make clear whether it considered that right absolute or considered the defendant's claim
of prejudice insufficient to overcome the public right. See Note, Constitutional Law and
the Criminal Trial: Exclusion of the Press from Voir Dire, 32 ARK. L. REv. 132 (1978).
89. Gannett Co. v. Burke, 551 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1977).
90. "[A] transcript of a proceeding is a sterile substitute for observing the actual
conduct of a hearing, as reviewing courts are well aware. Actual observation of the de-
meanor, voice and gestures of the participants in a hearing must be as informative to the
press and public as those same matters are to juries during trial." State ex rel. Dayton
Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 471, 351 N.E.2d 127, 136 (1976) (Stem,
J., concurring).
91. As the Supreme Court stated in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941):
It must be recognized that public interest is much more likely to be kindled by
a controversial event of the day than by a generalization, however penetrating,
of the historian or scientist. Since they punish utterances made during the
pendancy of a case, the judgments below therefore produce their restrictive
1979]
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A few courts, however, have recognized the problem and have
established standards for the validity of orders closing judicial
proceedings or sealing records. The New Hampshire Supreme
Court adopted the proposed American Bar Association standard,
which allows a trial court to close a pretrial hearing or seal records
in a criminal case only if failure to do so constitutes a clear and
present danger to a fair trial.92 This standard requires a finding
that information prejudicial to the defendant would reach jurors,
and that the court cannot curb the prejudicial effect by less re-
strictive alternatives. In United States v. Cianfrini,9 3 the Third
Circuit held that any motion to close a proceeding or seal a record
is proper only after full consideration of the important policies the
sixth amendment public trial provision serves. 4 Cianfrini re-
quires a court to test any claim for a departure from the constitu-
tional requirement of a public trial by a standard of "strict and
inescapable necessity" to ensure that only under the most excep-
tional circumstances may a judge close even limited portions of
a criminal trial. 5 Although the Second Circuit and ABA stan-
dards are clear and narrowly drawn, they apply only to criminal
proceedings. The lack of standards applicable to civil proceedings
is unfortunate because civil trials also may affect vital areas of
public concern. 96 A precise standard resting upon first amend-
ment values and applicable to both civil and criminal proceed-
ings is necessary to protect adequately the press' constitutionally
mandated role in relation to the public and the judiciary. 7
results at the precise time when public interest in the matter discussed would
naturally be at its height. Moreover, the ban is likely to fall not only at a crucial
time but upon the most important topics of discussion.
Id. at 268-69. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 561 ("element of time is
not unimportant if press coverage is to fulfill its traditional function of bringing news to
the public promptly"); Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
182 (1968) ("the present case involved . . . 'political' speech in which the element of
timeliness may be important").
92. Keene Publishing Corp. v. Keene Dist. Ct., - N.H. -. , 380 A.2d 261 (1977).
93. 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978).
94. See note 81 supra.
95. 573 F.2d at 854.
96. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (participant gag order
issued in a civil action against Kent State University officials and the National Guard
arising from a confrontation between demonstrating students and guardsmen). In invali-
dating the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility's no comment rules applicable to civil
actions, the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976), recognized that many important social issues
become entangled in civil litigation. Id. at 258.
97. This comment suggests such a standard is necessary to enable the press to provide
information to the public. One commentator, however, makes no distinction between
public and press and maintains the standard can be grounded in the first amendment
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Although Nebraska Press did not articulate a standard for
orders withholding information from the public and press, its
standard for direct press gag orders should apply because an
order closing a proceeding or sealing a record often curtails press
activity to as great a degree as a direct restraint on the press.
Under this approach, a trial court must find that less restrictive
measures would not mitigate adverse effects of publicity, and
explain why the proposed order would prevent the threatened
harm. This standard, coupled with sensitive procedural devices,
will ensure courts will limit first amendment rights of the public
and press only if they cannot avoid the confrontation between
first and sixth amendment rights by less restrictive alternatives.
Because Nebraska Press focused on the technical form of a
gag order rather than its chilling effects, the decision does not
adequately protect the press in its role as a free institution moni-
toring governmental power. Participant orders and orders with-
holding information from both the public and press can chill
speech and publication as effectively and completely as prior re-
straints on the press. Accordingly, procedural safeguards are
necessary to ensure that courts do not impose either indirect or
direct restraints on the press when less restrictive alternatives
would be effective. Several jurisdictions require courts to give
the press notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to entry of
a direct prior restraint; 8 courts should give the press the same
opportunity prior to entry of a participant gag order or an order
sealing a record or closing a judicial proceeding. The opportunity
to be heard would allow the trial judge to explore alternative
techniques to ensure a fair trial, to obtain a full airing of the first
amendment ramifications of a restraint, and to formulate an
order tailored as precisely as possible to the needs of the case.
Further, if a trial judge issues an order, expedited review should
be available in an independent forum to protect the immediacy
value of speech and publication on the judicial process.
right of public access. The approach is based on the premise the open trial enables the
public to scrutinize the workings of the judicial system and to participate "through the
'theatre of justice,' in the ritual process society has established to resolve conflicts." Note,
Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial Proceedings,
91 HARv. L. REV. 1899, 1923 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
98. United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 8 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974); New York Times Co. v. Starkey, 51 App. Div. 2d 60, 380 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1976);
State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Kainrad, 46 Ohio St. 2d 349, 351, 348
N.E.2d 695, 697 (1976); ABA LFGAL ADVISORY Comr' ON FREE TRL4 AN FAIR PRESS,
RECOMMENDED Couir Pocmma To ACCOMMODATE ibom-s oF FArm TRAL AND FiEE PRESs
(Rev. Draft Nov. 1975) (adopted by ABA House of Delegates, without changes, Aug. 12,
1976).
1979]
340 University of Puget Sound Law Review
The procedural safeguards the Supreme Court has developed
in obscenity cases provide a model for protection of the press'
right to cover judicial proceedings. When the state attempts to
regulate books or magazines as obscene, the Supreme Court has
fashioned a series of specific rules designed to prevent insensitive
procedural devices from. strangling first amendment interests."
The issue in obscenity cases is whether the speech to be regulated
is obscene, and thus outside the area of first amendment protec-
tion. Under the model, a judge cannot issue a restraint before
notice and an adversary hearing. Thus, procedural due process
requirements attach to the initial discussion concerning whether
regulation will infringe first amendment rights.
If the Constitution requires elaborate procedural safeguards
in the obscenity area, it should require equivalent procedural
protection when the speech implicates more central first amend-
ment values, as information on the judicial system does. 00 The
party petitioning for a participant or closure order should have
the burden of establishing that such an order is the least restric-
tive means to mitigate prejudice.' 10 If all other alternatives short
of infringing first amendment rights would be ineffective, the trial
judge should make specific factual findings indicating why the
order was necessary under the circumstances of the case. Further,
the judge must consider all alternatives to the order and detail
why each is inadequate. 02 The procedure helps to ensure the
judge is aware of both sides of the law and facts, and the record
helps to ensure that, having been made aware of the issues, the
judge has considered them.
If the only hearing is before the trial judge, however, the
procedure may be insufficient to prevent imposition of unconsti-
tutional gag orders. Judges may be inclined to grant the order to
insulate their conduct from criticism, to ease the task of assuring
a fair trial, or to respond to pressure from counsel for the defense
and prosecution.'"3 Past cases illustrate that despite a hearing
requirement judges can impose unconstitutional gag orders by
merely reciting, without further analysis, the factors required for
99. See Managhan, supra note 83, at 518-20.
100. For a discussion of the press' due process rights, see Fenner & Koley, supra note
1, at 442-52.
101. See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
102. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently adopted this procedure for determining
the validity of orders to seal records or close the courtroom. See Northwest Publications,
Inc. v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Minn. 1977).
103. See notes 86-87 supra and accompanying text.
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issuance of such an order. 04 Thus, notice and an opportunity to
be heard are, by themselves, inadequate to protect first amend-
ment interests; expedited review of the trial judge's order also
must be available in an independent forum.0 5When a state administers a censorship system to protect the
public from obscene motion pictures, the Constitution requires
the state to provide expedited judicial review of any prior re-
straint it imposes. 06 The state should provide a similar procedure
to ensure speedy review of direct and indirect gag orders. Provid-
ing the press with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to
issuance of orders gagging trial participants or withholding infor-
mation from the public and press, coupled with some form of
expedited review, provides more effective protection for media
coverage of judicial proceedings than Nebraska Press' narrow
prior restraint analysis.
As lower court decisions demonstrate, participant gag orders
and orders closing judicial proceedings can inhibit media cover-
age of the judicial system as effectively as direct prior restraints.
Further, a trial judge issuing these types of orders may lack neu-
trality because the media are reporting the court's workings and
perhaps the judge's performance. Thus, courts should grant the
press notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to issuance of
such orders. The judge should consider all alternatives to the
orders and list reasons for a conclusion that each is inadequate.
Finally, if a judge issues an order closing the courtroom or gagging
trial participants, expedited relief should be available in an inde-
pendent forum to protect the immediacy value of press coverage
104. See Des Moines Register and Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, __ Iowa __, 248
N.W.2d 493 (1976). The trial judge entered an order in a criminal trial restricting publica-
tion of jurors' names. The Iowa Supreme Court held the order unconstitutional because
it was entered without notice and hearing. The judge then held a hearing, noting seques-
tration, the supreme court's suggested alternative, was impractical because jurors had
family commitments, and again issued the order. The state supreme court again held the
order unconstitutional.
105. See Note, Ungagging the Press: Expedited Relief from Prior Restraints on News
Coverage of Criminal Proceedings, 65 GFo. L. REV. 81 (1976). The comment discusses
several procedures for prompt relief from the freezing effects of an unconstitutional re-
straint: staying the order pending plenary review on the merits; permitting the press to
violate the order and assert its unconstitutionality; and allowing expedited appellate
review on the merits of the gag order.
Commentators have explored various alternatives. See Landau, The Challenge of the
Communications Media, 62 A.B.A.J. 55 (1976) (automatic stay); Rendleman, Free Press-
Fair Trial: Review of Silence Orders, 52 N.C. L. Rev. 127 (1973) (examines various alterna-
tives); Roney, The Bar Answers the Challenge, 62 A.B.A.J. 60 (1976) (ABA recommenda-
tions).
106. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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on the judicial system. Such a procedure would help ensure ade-
quate protection for the press' role as a check on governmental
power and would avoid the triumph of form over substance that
prior restraint analysis fosters.
Valerie Bell
